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VIDEO-STREAMING RECORDS AND THE VIDEO PRIVACY 
PROTECTION ACT: BROADENING THE SCOPE OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION TO INCLUDE UNIQUE DEVICE 
IDENTIFIERS DISCLOSED WITH VIDEO TITLES
GREGORY M. HUFFMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Books and films are the intellectual vitamins that fuel the growth of indi-
vidual thought. The whole process of intellectual growth is one of priva-
cy—of quiet, and reflection. This intimate process should be protected 
from the disruptive intrusion of a roving eye.1
— Alfred “Al” A. McCandless, former Congressman
We all want to live in a society that values privacy. And we rightfully 
want both the Government and business to live in a society that respects 
this basic right. But privacy is not a generalized right. And it is up to the
legislature to define and give meaning to privacy.2
— Chuck Grassley, Senator
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) prohibits video tape ser-
vice providers from disclosing their consumers’ video rental or sale rec-
ords.3 Specifically, the VPPA prohibits a video tape service provider from 
knowingly disclosing personally identifiable information (“PII”) concern-
ing any of their consumers to third parties.4 Although the VPPA was enact-
ed in the era of video cassette tapes, Congress was well aware of the need
to continue to protect consumer privacy as technologies evolve.5 The 
*
J.D., December 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7 (1988).
2. 100 CONG. REC. S16, 314 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
3. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(1) (West 2015).
4. Id. Any person aggrieved by such a disclosure may bring a civil action in federal court to 
recover actual damages (in an amount not less than $2,500 in liquidated damages), punitive damages, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs, as well as any other appropriate preliminary or equitable 
relief. Id. § 2710(c)(1)–(2). Exceptions are made for disclosures: made to the consumer; with the con-
sumer’s written consent; pursuant to a court order or warrant; or incident to the ordinary course of 
business of the video tape service provider. Id. § 2710(b)(2).
5. Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union testified during a joint congressional hearing 
that: “[t]hese precious rights have grown increasingly vulnerable with the growth of advanced infor-
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VPPA broadly defines the term “video tape service provider” as “any per-
son, engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 
of rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar 
audio visual materials.”6 As such, the statute is applicable to not only video 
cassette tapes but also other media forms. Further, the statute defines a 
“consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services 
from a video tape service provider,”7 and recites that “the term ‘personally 
identifiable information’ includes information which identifies a person as 
having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a 
video tape service provider.”8
Interestingly, there was minimal litigation under the VPPA during the 
first two decades of its existence.9 However, the arrival of streaming video 
via web browsers and mobile applications has raised new questions of stat-
utory interpretation.10 Because the VPPA was originally enacted to protect 
the brick-and-mortar video store renter, one of these new questions was 
whether the VPPA even applies to disclosures by online video content pro-
viders.11
In 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California was the first court to consider this question, and ruled that the 
VPPA does in fact apply to online video content providers.12 In In re Hulu,
the court declined to accept the argument that Hulu13 is not a “video tape 
service provider.”14 At the same time, the court found that even a user who 
visited Hulu’s website to watch video content, but was not a paid subscrib-
er, should be considered a “consumer” under the VPPA.15 Two years later, 
mation technology. The new technologies not only foster more intrusive data collection, but make 
possible increased demands for personal, sensitive information.” S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7.
6. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(4) (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
8. Id. § 2710(a)(3).
9. See Evan Wooten & Zachariah DeMeola, A New Chapter in Video Privacy Protection Act’s
History, LAW360 (June 23, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/550346/a-new-chapter-
in-video-privacy-protection-act-s-history.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL 3282960 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 
2012).
13. According to Hulu’s website, “Hulu is an online video service that offers a selection of hit TV 
shows, clips, movies and more.” Overview, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015).
14. In re Hulu, 2012 WL 3282960, at *6 (reasoning that Hulu should be considered a video tape 
service provider for pleading purposes “given Congress’s concern with protecting consumer privacy in 
an evolving technological world”).
15. Id. at *8 (“If Congress wanted to limit the word ‘subscriber’ to ‘paid subscriber,’ it would 
have done so.”).
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the court went on to address a particular disclosure involving cookies16 sent 
from a Hulu user’s browser to Facebook.17 The cookies were automatically 
transmitted to Facebook when loading18 a Facebook Like button on the 
user’s watch page, and included: (1) a Facebook User ID, which identified 
the user on Facebook; and, (2) the name of the video the user was watch-
ing.19 The court determined that the disclosure of a Facebook User ID 
could be considered PII, depending on several unresolved issues of material 
fact, and consequently denied Hulu’s motion for summary judgment as to 
the disclosure of the Facebook User IDs.20
The decisions in the In re Hulu litigation caught the attention of litiga-
tors across the country, prompting many new VPPA class action lawsuits.21
For example, lawsuits were filed in early 2014 against ESPN,22 CNN,23
Dow Jones,24 and Walt Disney Co.,25 among others, alleging violations of 
the VPPA. The alleged violations in these new lawsuits do not simply in-
volve disclosures of users’ names and titles of videos watched by the us-
ers.26 Instead, the online video content providers have allegedly disclosed 
the unique device identifiers27 of their users’ devices (e.g., a MAC address 
or other unique serial number assigned to a device) and the titles of videos 
watched on the devices to third-party database marketing companies.28
16. In the computer context, a cookie is “a file that may be added to your computer when you visit 
a Web site and that contains information about you (such as an identification code or a record of the 
Web pages you have visited).” Cookie, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cookie (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
17. See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2014 WL 1724344 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 
2014).
18. “The analysis would be different if the Facebook cookies were sent when a user pressed the 
Like button. Information transmitted as a necessary part of a user’s decision to share his views about his 
videos with friends on Facebook would not support a VPPA violation.” Id. at *13.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *14–17 (denying motion for summary judgment).
21. See Wooten & DeMeola, supra note 9.
22. Complaint, Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., No. 14-cv-463 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2014).
23. Class Action Complaint, Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 14-cv-1194 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
18, 2014) [hereinafter CNN Complaint].
24. Complaint, Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 14-cv-744 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 13, 2014).
25. Complaint, Robinson v. Walt Disney Co., No. 14-cv-4146 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter Walt Disney Complaint].
26. See, e.g., id.
27. A unique device identifier, sometimes referred to simply as a unique identifier, is a type of 
identifier (e.g., a number or code) assigned to a device that is guaranteed to be unique such that the 
identifier can be used to distinguish the device among all other instances of the device. See, e.g., Priva-
cy & Terms – Key Terms, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/key-terms/#toc-terms-
unique-device-id (last visited Mar. 1, 2015); Device Identifiers, APPLICATION PRIVACY,
http://www.applicationprivacy.org/learn-resources/unique-device-identifier-udid-2/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015).
28. See, e.g., Walt Disney Complaint, supra note 25.
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These database marketing companies then collect and aggregate data from 
various other sources to create digital dossiers, or consumer profiles, for 
millions of individuals, and sell the digital dossiers to advertisers, retailers, 
and government agencies for a profit.29
A key issue going forward will therefore be whether the scope of PII 
under the VPPA is broad enough to cover a disclosure of a unique device 
identifier of a user’s device, as opposed to a direct indication of a user’s 
name, and the title of one or more videos watched on the device. With this 
issue in mind, this Note explores the scope of PII under the VPPA, with a 
particular emphasis on disclosures of unique device identifiers. Part I out-
lines the relevant technical aspects of unique device identifiers and explains 
their role in database marketing. Part II reviews the background and history 
of the VPPA and discusses recent case law. Finally, Part III argues that 
unique device identifiers should be protected as PII when disclosed in con-
junction with one or more video titles.
I. UNIQUE DEVICE IDENTIFIERS PLAY AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT 
ROLE IN THE FIELD OF DATABASE MARKETING
To help appreciate the issue outlined above regarding disclosures of 
unique device identifiers, it is worthwhile to illustrate a few examples of 
unique device identifiers and provide a brief overview of the use of unique 
device identifiers in the field of database marketing.
A. Definition and Examples of Unique Device Identifiers
As discussed generally in the introduction, a unique device identifier 
is a type of identifier (e.g., a number or code) assigned to a device that is 
guaranteed to be unique such that the identifier can be used to distinguish 
the device among all other instances of the device.30 For example, in the 
context of computing devices, a manufacturer may assign a unique number 
to each manufactured computing device.
One well-known example of such a unique device identifier is a media 
access control (“MAC”) address.31 MAC addresses are numeric codes gen-
erated according to standards set by the Institute of Electrical and Electron-
ics Engineers (“IEEE”) and assigned to network interfaces for use as 
29. See Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/how-your-data-are-being-deeply-mined.
30. See Privacy & Terms – Key Terms, supra note 27.
31. Standard Group MAC Addresses: A Tutorial Guide, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N,
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/regauth/tut/macgrp.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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network addresses for wired and wireless network technologies.32 Other 
examples include Apple’s UDID (a 40-character combination of letters and 
numbers assigned to devices such as iPads and iPhones) and Google’s An-
droid ID (a unique alphanumeric identifier assigned to mobile devices op-
erating an Android operating system).33
B. The Role of Unique Device Identifiers in Database Marketing
In the advertising industry, many marketers prefer to use direct mar-
keting methods, whereby marketing materials are provided directly to po-
tential customers, rather than running general advertisements over the 
Internet, television, or radio.34 One reason for favoring direct marketing 
over general (or non-direct) marketing is that direct marketing can be more 
cost-effective than non-direct marketing.35 For instance, according to a 
2010 study, “each dollar spent on direct marketing yields, on average, a 
return on investment of $11.73, versus a return on investment of $5.23 
from non-direct marketing expenditures.”36
One of the potential challenges for any direct marketing campaign is 
identifying a list of potential customers to target, since marketers do not 
want to waste their money marketing to customers that would not be inter-
ested in the product being marketed.37 Database marketing, a form of direct 
marketing, offers an appealing solution to this problem.
Database marketing uses databases storing information about custom-
ers or potential customers to generate targeted lists of customers.38 In prac-
tice, these databases often include customer data that is gleaned from 
records of past transactions, or information that customers provide when 
creating an online account profile, signing up for a company’s loyalty card, 
filling out a credit application, filling out a product warranty card, entering 
a sweepstakes, or subscribing to a newsletter or magazine, among other 
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Unique Phone ID Numbers Explained, WALL ST. J.:
DIGITS (Dec. 19, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/12/19/unique-phone-id-numbers-
explained.
34. See, e.g., Direct Marketing, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/direct-
marketing.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
35. See, e.g., Dana Larson, Is Direct Marketing Still an Effective Tactic?, BLUEWATER (Oct. 1, 
2010), http://www.bluewaterbrand.com/2010/10/is-direct-marketing-still-an-effective-tactic.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Database Marketing: Explore the Strategy of Database Marketing, MARKETING-
SCHOOLS.ORG, http://www.marketing-schools.org/types-of-marketing/database-marketing.html (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
38. See id.
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possibilities.39 Database marketing typically involves using statistical tech-
niques to mine this data and develop models of customer behavior, which 
can then be used to predict future behavior and identify a group of custom-
ers that are more likely to be receptive to a particular new product or ser-
vice.40
While a company can easily collect data regarding its existing cus-
tomers from its customers’ transactions with the company, the company 
may wish to obtain data regarding other potential customers, such as their 
names, home addresses, or email addresses. In some instances, a company 
may purchase additional data from another business.41 Alternatively, the 
company may purchase additional data from a third-party private company 
that specializes in collecting, aggregating, and brokering personal data.42
Since little is known about the inner-workings of many of these pri-
vate companies, there is growing concern over their data-collection meth-
ods and the extent of personal data stored in their databases:
Using techniques ranging from supermarket loyalty cards to targeted ad-
vertising on Facebook, private companies systematically collect very 
personal information, from who you are, to what you do, to what you 
buy. Data about your online and offline behavior are combined, ana-
lyzed, and sold to marketers, corporations, governments, and even crimi-
nals. The scope of this collection is similar to, if not larger than, that of 
the NSA, yet it is almost entirely unregulated . . . .43
To appreciate the amount of data being aggregated, consider that 
Acxiom, one of the largest companies in the database marketing industry, 
has “23,000 computer servers that process more than 50 trillion data trans-
actions per year” and “claims to have records on hundreds of millions of 
Americans, including 1.1 billion browser cookies . . . and an average of 
1,500 pieces of data per consumer.”44 These records are often referred to as 
“digital dossiers,” which Acxiom analyzes to determine whether a particu-
lar customer “fit[s] into a number of predefined categories such as 
‘McMansions and Minivans’ or ‘adult with wealthy parent.’”45
The collection of unique device identifiers plays an important role for 
third-party companies like Acxiom, who rely on unique device identifiers 
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. For instance, Barnes and Noble bought customer records from Borders when Borders went out 
of business. Id.
42. See Marwick, supra note 29.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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to create their digital dossiers.46 These companies allegedly use unique 
device identifiers to establish correlations between particular individuals 
and their mobile devices.47 Once a correlation between a particular individ-
ual and his/her mobile device is established, the individual’s actions on the 
mobile device can be combined with data regarding the individual’s offline 
actions (e.g., transactions at brick-and-mortar retail stores, home owner-
ship, family income, marital status, zip code, favorite television shows, 
etc.).48 Further, if an individual uses multiple devices, the unique device 
identifiers of each of her devices can be used to link the individual’s activi-
ties across each of her devices.49 Furthermore, the unique device identifier 
of an individual’s mobile device can also be used to help track which busi-
nesses the individual visits.50
II. THE BACKGROUND, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND RECENT CASE 
LAW OF THE VPPA
In 1987, while the Senate was holding hearings on the nomination of 
then-Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, a newspaper in Washing-
ton, D.C. obtained Judge Bork’s rental records from a local video store, and 
published an article describing Judge Bork’s viewing history.51 At the time, 
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee were outraged.52 As Senator 
Patrick Leahy explained:
It is nobody’s business what . . . Robert Bork . . . watch[es] on television 
or read[s] or think[s] about when [he is] home. I am concerned because 
in an era of interactive television cables, the growth of computer check-
ing and check-out counters, of security systems and telephones, all 
lodged together in computers, it would be relatively easy at some point 
to give a profile of a person and tell what they buy in a store, what kind 
of food they like, what sort of television programs they watch, who are 
some of the people they telephone . . . . I think that is wrong. I think that 
really is Big Brother, and I think it is something that we have to guard 
against.53
46. See, e.g., CNN Complaint, supra note 23, at 15–21.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1850–51 (2011).
49. See CNN Complaint, supra note 23, at 15–21.
50. See, e.g., Kate Crawford, When Big Data Marketing Becomes Stalking: Data Brokers Cannot 
Be Trusted to Regulate Themselves, SCI. AM. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/when-big-data-marketing-becomes-stalking1.
51. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5–6.
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Just over one year later, Congress passed the VPPA.54 The following 
is a review of the background and legislative history surrounding the 
VPPA, as well as recent case law interpreting the term PII.
A. The Historical Background Leading to the Enactment of the VPPA
In 1987, Representative Al McCandless introduced House Bill 3523 
“to preserve personal privacy with respect to the rental or purchase of video 
tapes by individuals.”55 House Bill 3523 was unsuccessful, but several 
Senators introduced a related bill, Senate Bill 2361 during the following 
spring.56 At the same time, Representatives Robert Kastenmeier and 
McCandless introduced another video privacy protection bill, House Bill 
4947, in the House of Representatives.57 Both Senate Bill 2361 and House 
Bill 4947 initially sought protection with respect to not only video rental 
records, but also records concerning the use of library materials and ser-
vices.58
The concurrent bills in the House and Senate were an effort to put an 
end to the increase in what Representative Kastenmeier referred to as 
“troublesome invasions of privacy—by both private individuals and the 
Government.”59 While speaking about this bill in front of the House, Rep-
resentative Kastenmeier not only mentioned the Judge Bork incident de-
scribed above, but also cited another controversial invasion of privacy: the 
FBI’s Library Awareness Program.60 Apparently, the FBI had been at-
tempting to coerce librarians into disclosing circulation records and report-
ing any patrons with suspicious library activity.61
In addition to addressing the privacy issue, these federal bills were an 
effort to create a “uniform national standard” with respect to the disclosure 
of video store and library records.62 Prior to the introduction of House Bill 
4947 and Senate Bill 2361, several states had already enacted laws prohib-
iting the disclosure of library records and/or video store records.63 After a 
54. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988).
55. H.R. 3523, 100th Cong. (1987).
56. S. 2361, 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted).
57. H.R. 4947, 100th Cong. (1988).
58. See id. § 2(a)(2); S. 2361 § 2(a)(2).
59. 134 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 29, 1988).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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joint hearing on both House Bill 4947 and Senate Bill 2361,64 Congress 
elected to move forward with Senate Bill 2361, which was eventually en-
acted as the VPPA.65 All of the provisions related to library records were 
removed from the bill, however, due to disagreement regarding the applica-
tion of the bill to law enforcement efforts.66
The VPPA followed in the footsteps of many other federal privacy 
protection statutes that protect records containing information about indi-
viduals, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (records maintained by credit 
reporting bureaus),67 the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974 (educational records maintained by schools and colleges),68 the Priva-
cy Act of 1974 (records stored by federal agencies),69 the Tax Reform Act 
of 1976 (individual tax returns),70 the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 
1978 (records maintained by banks),71 the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 
(records maintained by press offices),72 the Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984 (records maintained by cable providers),73 and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (records of electronic communica-
tions by cellular phone, email, etc.).74
It is interesting to compare the VPPA’s approach to defining PII with 
those of other federal privacy protection statutes. As mentioned above, the 
VPPA prohibits a video tape service provider from knowingly disclosing 
PII concerning any of its consumers.75 The VPPA also clarifies that “the 
term ‘personally identifiable information’ includes information which iden-
tifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or 
64. Video and Library Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4947 and S. 2361 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the 
Subcomm. on Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988).
65. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 1 (1988).
66. Id. at 8.
67. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 601–622, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012)).
68. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 513, 88 Stat. 571 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)).
69. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 
552a (2012)).
70. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1667 (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012)).
71. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100–1122, 92 Stat. 3697 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012)).
72. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000aa (2012)).
73. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2794 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012)).
74. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., including 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)).
75. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(1) (West 2015).
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services from a video tape service provider.”76 However, the VPPA itself 
does not provide any other guidance regarding what types of data are or are 
not covered by PII.77 In this manner, the VPPA is similar to other federal 
privacy protection statutes, such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 
which defines one or more classes of protected data, “but do[es] not pro-
vide useful guidance on how to determine which data element falls within 
which class.”78 Meanwhile, other more recent statutes, such as the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”)79 and the Driv-
er’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994,80 expressly identify data elements 
considered to be protected.81
B. The Legislative History of the VPPA: A Broad, Expansive 
Interpretation of Personally Identifiable Information
Analyzing the legislative history of the VPPA shows that Congress in-
tended for the term PII to be broadly interpreted. The initial House bill 
aimed at protecting video privacy, House Bill 3523, did not include any 
mention of PII.82 Instead, the bill merely prohibited disclosure of “the iden-
tity of the individual who rented or purchased” a video tape.83 The broader 
term PII, and its original definition, first appeared in a version of Senate 
Bill 2361: “[T]he term ‘personally identifiable information’ includes in-
formation which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specif-
ic materials or services from a video tape service provider or library.”84
This definition was subsequently amended to strike the words “or library”85
and limit the materials or services to “video materials or services.”86 But
76. Id. § 2710(a)(3).
77. See Scot Ganow & Sam S. Han, Model Omnibus Privacy Statute, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 
352 (2010).
78. Id. at 360. For example, the Right to Financial Privacy Act protects an individual’s financial 
records; ‘“financial record’ means an original of, a copy of, or information known to have been derived 
from, any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer’s relationship with the financial 
institution.” 12 U.S.C. § 3401(2) (2012).
79. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1301–1308, 112 
Stat. 2681-728 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012)).
80. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 300001–300003, 108 Stat. 
2099 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012)).
81. See Ganow & Han, supra note 77, at 361–63.
82. H.R. 3523, 100th Cong. (1987). 
83. Id. § 2(a)(2).
84. S. 2361 § 2(a)(2), 100th Cong. (1988) (enacted).
85. 134 CONG. REC. S16216 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
86. 134 CONG. REC. H10410 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (“The definition of personally identifiable 
information includes the term ‘video’ to make clear that simply because a business is engaged in the 
sale or rental of video materials or services does not mean that all of its products or services are within 
the scope of the bill.”).
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 160 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 160 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
14HUFFMAN-FINAL REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 8:23 PM
2016] VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 747
this first definition of PII is otherwise identical to the definition of PII 
found in the VPPA today.87
A few of the congressional records surrounding the VPPA shed light 
on the meaning and scope of the term PII. By way of example, in his sec-
tion-by-section analysis of Senate Bill 2361, Representative Kastenmeier, a 
sponsor of the related House bill, explained that “[u]nlike the other defini-
tions in this subsection, subsection (a)(3) uses the word ‘includes’ to estab-
lish a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of personally identifiable 
information.”88 As another example, Senate Report 599 on Senate Bill 
2361 states that “[t]he bill prohibits video stores from disclosing ‘personal-
ly identifiable information’—information that links the customer or patron 
to particular materials or services.”89 Senate Report 599 also mentions that 
“[t]he Act allows consumers to maintain control over personal information 
divulged and generated in exchange for receiving services from video tape 
service providers.”90
Moreover, the purpose and motivation for enacting the VPPA also 
provides support for a broad reading of PII. As discussed above, one of the 
primary impetuses for the VPPA was the disclosure in a Washington, D.C. 
newspaper of then-Judge Robert Bork’s rental records from a local video 
store.91 And the VPPA was intended to address that incident as well as 
other less-newsworthy incidents.92 Furthermore, Senate Report 599 clearly 
identifies the purpose of the VPPA as “[t]o preserve personal privacy with 
respect to the rental, purchase, or delivery of video tapes or similar audio 
visual materials.”93 Similarly, representative Kastenmeier eloquently 
summed up the purpose of the VPPA as follows:
Every day, people are asked to disclose information about themselves 
that someone then squirrels away in a computer. Every time we provide 
such information, we’re giving a piece of ourselves to someone else. The 
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 ensures that video service provid-
ers will respect the privacy of that with which we have entrusted them.94
87. The 2013 amendment to the VPPA did not change the definition of PII. See Video Privacy 
Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414 (2013).
88. 134 CONG. REC. H10410.
89. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7 (1988).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 5–6.
93. Id. at 1.
94. 134 CONG. REC. H10411 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 160 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 160 Side B      05/10/2016   13:13:34
14HUFFMAN-FINAL REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 8:23 PM
748 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:2
C. Recent Case Law: A Narrow Interpretation of PII at Odds with the 
Broad Interpretation Supported by the Legislative History
As discussed in the introduction, the Northern District of California 
recently interpreted the scope of PII.95 In re Hulu involved the disclosure of 
a Facebook User ID.96 Unlike a unique device identifier which is assigned 
to a particular device, a Facebook User ID is assigned to a particular user.97
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the rationale of the court in In re 
Hulu since the litigation involved interpreting the scope of PII under the 
VPPA.
The facts of In re Hulu indicate that when a user was logged in to Fa-
cebook on her browser and the user’s browser loaded a Hulu web page to 
watch a video, the user’s browser sent to Facebook a cookie that identified 
the user’s Facebook User ID.98 The user’s browser also executed code that 
provided the web page’s URL, which included the title of the video, to 
Facebook.99 Therefore, one of the issues before the court was whether a 
disclosure of a Facebook User ID and a title of a video qualifies as PII un-
der the VPPA.100
The court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he [VPPA’s] plain lan-
guage . . . does not say ‘identify by name’ and thus plainly encompasses 
other means of identifying a person.”101 Further, the court determined that 
the ordinary meaning of the plain language suggests that “the disclosure 
must be pegged to an identifiable person (as opposed to an anonymous 
person).”102
Because the court found the statute’s plain language to be “ambiguous 
about whether it covers unique anonymous user IDs,” it turned to the legis-
lative history for guidance.103 In particular, the court noted the Judge Bork 
incident as one of the motivations for the VPPA, and analyzed portions of 
Senate Report 599 discussed above.104 The order from the district court 
quoted several portions from the section-by-section analysis of Senate Re-
95. See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2014 WL 1724344 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 
2014).
96. Id. at *7. A Facebook User ID is a unique number assigned to a Facebook user. See, e.g.,
Alyson Shontell, How to Find Your Facebook Number, BUS. INSIDER (June 1, 2011, 3:04 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-find-your-facebook-number-2011-6.
97. See Shontell, supra note 96.
98. In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *5.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id. at *7.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *8.
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port 599 that elaborates on the statutory definition of PII, including a few 
lines from page seven which describe PII as “information that links the 
customer or patron to particular materials or services.”105 After quoting a 
few other passages from Senate Report 599, the court stated that “[t]he 
plain language of the statute suggests, and the Senate Report confirms, that 
the statute protects personally identifiable information that identifies a spe-
cific person and ties that person to particular videos that the person 
watched,” and cited to page seven of Senate Report 599 for support.106
Thus, it appears that the court was particularly persuaded by Senate Report 
599’s description of PII as “information that links the customer or patron to 
particular materials or services.”107
The court opted not to rely on the legislative history alone, and looked 
to precedent from other cases to support its interpretation.108 Interestingly, 
because of the lack of precedent directly addressing the disclosure of 
unique identifiers under the VPPA, the court looked to the scope of PII 
under the Cable Act of 1984.109 Specifically, the court examined a case in 
which Comcast had given to some of its new customers used cable con-
verter boxes that still included prior customers’ pay-per-view purchase 
records.110 The information stored on the cable converter boxes did not 
directly indicate the names or addresses of prior customers, but included 
hexadecimal codes111 that Comcast, but not the new customers, could de-
code to identify specific customers.112 Therefore, to an unsuspecting new 
customer, the hexadecimal code was not PII.113
The court summed up the rule from the cable converter case as fol-
lows: “an anonymous unique ID without more does not constitute PII. 
But . . . if an anonymous unique ID were disclosed to a person who could 
understand it, that might constitute PII.”114 In other words, “context could 
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7 (1988).
108. In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *9.
109. See 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). The Cable Act is similar to the VPPA in that the Cable Act 
protects PII regarding cable subscribers.  See, e.g., In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *10.
110. In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *10.
111. A hexadecimal code is a number defined in the hexadecimal numbering system. The hexadec-
imal numbering system is often used in computing systems and has a base of 16. Typically, hexadeci-
mal codes are represented using sixteen distinct symbols: 0-9 representing values zero to nine and A-F
representing values ten to fifteen. See, e.g., Tim Fisher, What Is Hexadecimal? Definition of Hexadeci-
mal & How to Count in Hexadecimal, ABOUT TECH,
http://pcsupport.about.com/od/termshm/g/hexadecimal.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
112. Pruitt v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 100 F. App’x 713, 715 (10th Cir. 2004).
113. Id. at 716.
114. In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *11 (emphasis in original).
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render [disclosure of a seemingly anonymous unique ID] not anonymous 
and the equivalent of the identification of a specific person.”115 When ap-
plying this reasoning to Hulu’s disclosure of Facebook User IDs, the court 
appropriately classified the unique identifiers as “more than a unique, 
anonymous identifier.”116 Indeed, one can easily identify a Facebook user’s 
name (and other information) from a Facebook User ID.117 But because of 
unresolved issues of material fact as to whether “the information transmit-
ted to Facebook was sufficient to identify individual customers” and Hulu’s 
knowledge118 of the disclosures, the court stopped short of deeming the 
disclosure of a Facebook User ID tied to a video title as PII.119
Given the scant amount of precedent in this area, other courts were 
quick to adopt the interpretation of the scope of PII from In re Hulu. For 
instance, in Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., the Northern District of Georgia 
held that, because an Android ID (“a randomly generated number that is 
unique to each user and device”) does not without more identify a specific 
person, disclosure of an Android ID in conjunction with a user’s viewing 
history on a mobile application is not PII and does not violate the VPPA.120
Likewise, the District of New Jersey defined PII as “information which 
must, without more, itself link an actual person to actual video materi-
als.”121 Consequently, the District of New Jersey reasoned that an alleged 
disclosure of cookies containing video titles, anonymous user IDs, and data 
about users’ computers did not qualify as PII.122
III. THE CASE FOR BROADENING THE SCOPE OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION TO INCLUDE UNIQUE DEVICE IDENTIFIERS
The final part of this Note outlines several arguments for broadening 
the scope of PII to include unique device identifiers and then evaluates 
several potential criticisms of broadening the scope of PII in this manner.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *14.
117. See, e.g., Getting Username from Facebook ID, EXTRAMASTER (Mar. 17, 2013), 
http://blog.extramaster.net/2013/03/getting-username-from-facebook-id.html.
118. In order to incur liability under the VPPA, a video tape service provider must have “knowing-
ly” disclosed PII. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b)(1) (West 2015).
119. In re Hulu, 2014 WL 1724344, at *15–16.
120. Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-484, 2014 WL 5023535, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 
2014).
121. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., MDL No. 2443(SRC), 2015 WL 248334, at *3 
(D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2015) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id.
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A. Broadening the Scope of Personally Identifiable Information to 
Encompass Unique Device Identifiers Disclosed 
in Conjunction with Video Titles
Although courts have been reluctant to assert that unique device iden-
tifiers constitute PII when disclosed in conjunction with one or more video 
titles, this type of disclosure should be protected as PII in light of the 
VPPA’s broad definition of PII, technological changes in the way consum-
ers view video content, and the practical alternatives available to video-
streaming providers.
As discussed above, the VPPA was meant to protect consumers’ “per-
sonal information divulged and generated in exchange for” renting or pur-
chasing video materials.123 And by using the word “includes” when 
defining PII, subsection (a)(3) of the VPPA establishes a minimum defini-
tion of PII that is not exclusive.124 In other words, PII was meant to cover, 
at a minimum, “information which identifies a person as having requested 
or obtained specific video materials or services,” but also cover other types 
of identifying information.125 The legislative history firmly supports and 
validates this interpretation.126 Additionally, the advantage of defining PII 
in this manner is that the scope of PII “can evolve and remain flexible in 
response to new developments.”127
Given the foregoing, the interpretation of PII proffered by the North-
ern District of California in In re Hulu, and subsequently adopted by other 
courts across the country, is too rigid. PII should not be limited to infor-
mation that must, without more, connect an actual person to actual video 
materials. This definition may have been suitable during the first decade 
following the enactment of the VPPA, but it is arguably inappropriate to-
day.
Many consumers no longer rent or purchase videos at brick-and-
mortar video stores, where they were previously asked to provide their 
names and possibly their addresses in exchange for the right to purchase or 
rent a video cassette, DVD, Blu-ray, etc. Instead, consumers are now shift-
ing to streaming movies using their televisions, computers, and mobile 
devices.128 This new avenue for consuming video content creates new types 
123. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 8 (1988).
124. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (a)(3) (West 2015).
125. Id.
126. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 12. 
127. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 48, at 1829.
128. See, e.g., Chiang-nan Chao & Saibei Zhao, Emergence of Movie Stream Challenges Tradi-
tional DVD Movie Rental—An Empirical Study with a User Focus, INT’L J. BUS. ADMIN. 22, 22 (2013). 
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of personal information that must be safeguarded. By way of example, 
rather than providing only their name and address in exchange for video 
materials, consumers now provide the unique device identifiers of their 
video-streaming devices in exchange for video materials. It is against this 
backdrop that the scope of PII should be defined today.
Rather than only including information that links an actual person to 
actual video materials without more, the scope of PII should simply en-
compass information that links an actual person to actual video materi-
als.129 The interpretation requiring the disclosed information itself to 
identify a person does not appreciate the broad definition of PII that is 
found within the VPPA.130 Information that itself identifies an actual per-
son is an example of PII that falls within the minimum definition of PII 
outlined above.131 And in the context of rental or purchase of physical vid-
eo materials (e.g., video cassette tapes or DVDs), perhaps such a minimum 
definition is workable. But when a particular consumer exposes other types 
of information that can be used to link the particular consumer to videos 
viewed by the particular consumer, a broader, more inclusive definition of 
PII is necessary to preserve personal privacy.
In line with the discussion above, a unique device identifier of a de-
vice can be correlated with a particular individual, such that videos 
watched on the device can be linked to the particular individual.132 For the 
VPPA to adequately protect the particular individual’s personal privacy, 
the scope of PII needs to be broadened to include the disclosure of the 
unique device identifier of the individual's device in conjunction with the 
titles of videos watched on the individual’s device. Otherwise, video-
streaming providers could continue to escape liability by disclosing unique 
device identifiers of their consumers' devices to third-party data-
aggregation companies, to whom unique device identifiers are just as valu-
able as names and addresses in terms of correlating video content with 
particular individuals.133
The ease with which third-party data-aggregation companies can cor-
relate unique device identifiers to particular individuals also suggests that 
the scope of PII should include unique device identifiers disclosed in con-
129. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 7 (defining PII as “information that links the customer or patron to 
particular materials or services” without using qualifications such as without more or itself).
130. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(3).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., Schwartz & Solove, supra note 48, at 1843–44.
133. See, e.g., CNN Complaint, supra note 23, at 15–21.
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junction with video titles.134 Generally, when considering whether a piece 
of data is “identifying,” one important factor is the ease with which the 
piece of data can be correlated with other pieces of data that ultimately lead 
to an identification of a particular individual.135 The easier it is to correlate 
a piece of data with information that can be used to identify an individual, 
the more likely that piece of data should be protected.136 And further, “[a]s 
the volume of data increases, so too do the chances for identifiability.”137 A
company that collects millions of data points regarding millions of individ-
uals, and specializes in correlating pieces of data with particular individu-
als, can easily correlate a unique device identifier with a particular 
individual.138 Therefore, because unique device identifiers can easily be 
linked to particular individuals, a disclosure of a unique device identifier 
and a video title should qualify as information which identifies a person as 
having obtained a specific video (i.e., PII).139
Moreover, a broad interpretation of the scope of PII will be in accord 
with existing concerns regarding consumer privacy expressed by the legis-
lature. Members of Congress have expressed concern about the use of da-
tabase marketing. Various Senators have warned about the use of 
consumers’ personal information, including the collection and tracking of 
unique device identifiers.140 Similarly, recent actions of federal government 
actors demonstrate concerns over the tracking of unique device identifiers. 
For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, which regu-
lates the disclosure of children’s personal information, was recently 
amended to broaden the scope of personal information.141 The regulation 
had always defined “personal information” as “individually identifiable 
information about an individual collected online, including: . . . persistent 
identifier[s],” but the meaning of persistent identifiers was extended to 
134. See Eloise Gratton, If Personal Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, Then Risk of Harm Is the 
Key: A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as Personal Information, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 105, 175 (2014).
135. Id. at 171.
136. See id. at 172.
137. Id. at 174.
138. See, e.g., Marwick, supra note 29.
139. See Gratton, supra note 134.
140. See, e.g., Consumer Privacy and Protection in the Mobile Marketplace: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 112th 
Cong. (2011).
141. The Federal Trade Commission’s initial regulations became effective on April 21, 2000. The 
Federal Trade Commission’s amended rule took effect on July 1, 2013. See Complying with COPPA: 
Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 16, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions.
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include “device serial number[s]” and “unique device identifier[s].”142
Thus, an expanded interpretation of PII under the VPPA that includes 
unique device identifiers disclosed along with video titles would be con-
sistent with recent administrative sentiments about consumer privacy.
Likewise, broadening the scope of PII would be consistent with Con-
gress’ intent for the VPPA to evolve over time. When Congress passed the 
VPPA, it was aware of how technology was revolutionizing the way people 
watched videos, and the need to protect the right to privacy “as we continue 
to move ahead.”143 Congress did not choose to define a video tape service 
provider as a brick-and-mortar video store.144 Instead, by including the 
broad catch-all term “similar audio visual materials,” Congress defined a 
video tape service provider in a way that would protect consumers’ interac-
tions with the brick-and-mortar video stores of the future.145 Further, as 
discussed above, Senate Report 599 also mentions that the VPPA was de-
signed to allow consumers “to maintain control over personal information 
divulged and generated in exchange for receiving services from video tape 
service providers.”146 As video tape service providers evolve and consum-
ers divulge different forms of identification to video tape service providers, 
the notion of what qualifies as PII should similarly evolve.
Indeed, many commentators have noted that the definition of PII is 
changing as technology evolves.147 While certain types of information may 
relate to an inanimate object itself (e.g., a smartphone or tablet) rather than 
an individual directly, some argue that information about a “device linked 
to a small number of individuals” qualifies as personal information.148 Ad-
ditionally, as part of a developing trend, many states now protect IP ad-
dresses of computing devices as PII.149 This movement is driven in part by 
the idea that it is becoming harder and harder to “de-identify” data:
The more information about a person that is known, the more likely it 
becomes that this information can be used to identify that person or de-
142. The regulation defines personal information as “individually identifiable information about an 
individual collected online, including . . . (7) A persistent identifier that can be used to recognize a user 
over time and across different Web sites or online services. Such persistent identifier includes, but is not 
limited to, a customer number held in a cookie, an Internet Protocol (IP) address, a processor or device 
serial number, or unique device identifier.” 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2015).
143. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 6 (1988).
144. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(4) (West 2015).
145. Id.
146. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 8.
147. See, e.g., Gratton, supra note 134, at 136–39.
148. Id.
149. Joshua J. McIntyre, Comment, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L.
REV. 895, 918–19 (2011).
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termine further data about her. When aggregated, information has a way 
of producing more information, such that de-identification of data be-
comes more difficult.150
And even when data is de-identified, there are still ways to re-identify 
the data.151 Thus, it is arguably necessary to increase the scope of PII in 
order to limit the number of data pieces available for aggregation and iden-
tification.
Finally, the potential benefits of broadening the scope of PII outweigh 
the potential burdens of doing so. If the scope of PII under the VPPA were 
to be broadened to include unique device identifiers disclosed in conjunc-
tion with video titles, it would be illegal for a video-streaming content pro-
vider to disclose viewing records that include specific video titles and 
unique device identifiers to third parties.152 This would provide greater 
privacy to customers of such a video-streaming content provider. It would 
theoretically be more difficult for the customers’ viewing histories to be 
correlated with their identities, since data-aggregation companies would no 
longer be able to use the customers’ unique device identifiers for correla-
tion and identification purposes.
On the other hand, for the video-streaming content provider, its cus-
tomers’ viewing records may potentially become less valuable. This could, 
in turn, result in a decrease in revenue for the video-streaming content pro-
vider, assuming third parties would not be willing to pay as much for view-
ing records that are not associated with unique device identifiers. However, 
there are several options still available for the video-streaming content 
provider to profit from its customers’ viewing records. The VPPA allows 
the video-streaming content provider to disclose PII of any consumer with 
the informed, written consent of that consumer.153 The VPPA also allows 
the video-streaming content provider to disclose solely the name and ad-
dress of a consumer in conjunction with the subject matter of videos 
viewed by the consumer, provided that the consumer was given the oppor-
tunity to prohibit such disclosure and the “disclosure is for the exclusive 
use of marketing goods and services directly to the consumer.”154 Further, 
the VPPA presumably would allow the video-streaming content provider to 
disclose a unique device identifier of a consumer’s device in conjunction 
150. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 48, at 1843.
151. Id.
152. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(b) (West 2015).
153. See id. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
154. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(D).
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with a subject matter of videos viewed by the consumer, as long as the 
disclosure did not identify particular videos viewed by the consumer.155
On balance, the potential benefits to the video-streaming content pro-
vider’s consumers appear to outweigh the burdens on the video-streaming 
content provider. Expanding the scope of PII under the VPPA to cover 
unique device identifiers linked to video titles could provide increased pri-
vacy to consumers that stream videos without completely barring video-
streaming content providers from marketing their customers’ viewing in-
formation. This analysis is in accord with the recent actions of several large 
players in the technology industry who have recognized the importance of 
protecting consumer privacy. For example, due to consumer privacy con-
cerns, Apple Inc. began randomizing MAC addresses when iPhones scan 
for Wi-Fi signals, in an effort to prevent companies from tracking move-
ment of individuals using the MAC addresses of their iPhones.156 Similarly, 
Google Inc. switched from using its unique Android ID for advertising 
purposes in apps to using an anonymous identifier.157 The new anonymous 
identifier is “a long, anonymous string of digits that will allow tracking and 
ad targeting without relying on an identifier uniquely married to the de-
vice” and can be reset by a user.158
B. Arguments Against Broadening the Scope of Personally Identifiable 
Information to Include Unique Device Identifiers
Perhaps the primary concern with broadening the scope of PII in the 
manner proposed herein is that unique device identifiers are assigned to 
inanimate objects (namely, computers, mobile devices, televisions, etc.) 
rather than to particular individuals, and therefore, unique device identifiers 
serve to identify objects rather than individuals. Because of this concern, 
155. See In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 1724344, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 
2014).
156. See, e.g., Aaron Mamiit, Apple Implements Random MAC Address on iOS 8. Goodbye, Mar-
keters, TECH TIMES (June 12, 2014, 3:46 AM),
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/8233/20140612/apple-implements-random-mac-address-on-ios-8-
goodbye-marketers.htm. Unfortunately, the feature seems to work only in limited scenarios (when 
location tracking is off, the iPhone is in sleep mode, and the iPhone is not connected to a Wi-Fi net-
work). See Jim Edwards, Apple’s New Anti-Tracking System for iPhones Doesn’t Work, Researcher 
Claims, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 1, 2014, 6:18 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ios-8-mac-
randomization-wifi-iphone-doesnt-work-2014-10.
157. See, e.g., Greg Sterling, Google Replacing “Android ID” with “Advertising ID” Similar to 
Apple’s IFDA, MARKETING LAND (Oct. 31, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://marketingland.com/google-
replacing-android-id-with-advertising-id-similar-to-apples-idfa-63636.
158. Id.
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 165 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 165 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
14HUFFMAN-FINAL REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2016 8:23 PM
2016] VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 757
courts have been reluctant to grant protection under the VPPA to infor-
mation about an individual’s device(s).159
This criticism is flawed for at least two reasons. Initially, as outlined 
above, such a narrow interpretation of PII under the VPPA is improper in 
light of the text, purpose, and legislative history of the VPPA.160 Further-
more, the concern about information identifying a device instead of a per-
son fails to appreciate the changing nature of personal information; many 
people now use computing devices on a daily basis, and those computing 
devices can be traced back to particular individuals. Interestingly, as dis-
cussed above, the amended text of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule now unequivocally suggests that a unique device identifier of an indi-
vidual’s device does qualify as PII about that individual.161 Likewise, legis-
lators are shifting towards protecting information about computing devices, 
such as IP addresses, as PII.162 Moreover, many statutes consistently pro-
tect data that does not necessarily identify an individual, such as a home 
address or telephone number.163 Like a home address or telephone number, 
a unique device identifier may certainly be tied to a particular individual, 
and thus, merit similar protection. In the not-so-distant future, the trend to 
extend protection to information about individuals’ devices is likely to 
continue, rather than regress.
Another related concern about broadening the scope of PII in the 
manner proposed herein is that considering information that identifies a 
device (rather than an individual) to be PII may be problematic if multiple 
people use the same device. As the argument goes, multiple individuals 
may share the same device, and consequently, information that identifies 
that device identifies multiple individuals rather than just one specific indi-
vidual.164 This criticism is also without merit, as many types of PII do not 
necessarily identify a single person either. For instance, “multiple people 
may have the same name, multiple residents may share the same home 
address and telephone number, and multiple users may log in to the same e-
mail address.”165 In other words, unique device identifiers are actually quite 
similar to other forms of potentially ambiguous personal information.
159. See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., MDL No. 2443(SRC), 2014 WL 
3012873, at *10 (D.N.J. July 2, 2014).
160. See supra Part II(B).
161. 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (West 2015).
162. See McIntyre, supra note 149, at 918–19.
163. See id. at 934–35.
164. See, e.g., In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11-03764, 2014 WL 1724344, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 28, 2014).
165. McIntyre, supra note 149, at 906.
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CONCLUSION
The VPPA prohibits a video tape service provider from knowingly 
disclosing PII concerning any of its consumers to third parties. This Note 
has argued that a disclosure that includes a unique device identifier of a 
user’s device and the title of a video should qualify as PII under the VPPA.
Reviewing the legislative history surrounding the VPPA and recent 
case law reveals that the interpretation of PII adopted by several courts is 
too rigid. Rather than only including information that links an actual person 
to actual video materials without more, the scope of PII should simply en-
compass information that links an actual person to actual video materials. 
Broadening the scope of PII in this manner is merited given Congress’ 
motivation for enacting the VPPA, technological changes in the way con-
sumers view video content today, and the ease with which unique device 
identifiers can be correlated with particular individuals. By the same token, 
broadening the scope of PII would address growing concerns regarding 
consumer privacy and be consistent with the changing notion of what quali-
fies as PII.
Thus, unique device identifiers of devices that are disclosed with vid-
eo titles viewed on those devices should be protected as PII under the 
VPPA.
